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This paper discusses the fundamental underpinnings and some implications of transaction cost regulation
(TCR), a framework to analyze the interaction between governments and investors fundamentally,
but not exclusively, in utility industries.  TCR sees regulation as the governance structure of these
interactions, and thus, as in standard transaction cost economics, it places emphasis in understanding
the nature of the hazards inherent to these interactions.  The emphasis on transactional hazards requires
a microanalytical perspective, where performance assessment is undertaken within the realm of possible
institutional alternative. In that sense, politics becomes fundamental to understanding regulation as
the governance of public / private interactions. The paper discusses two fundamental hazards and their
organizational implications: governmental and third party opportunism. Both interact to make regulatory








spiller@haas.berkeley.edu  Pablo T. Spiller 
    2 
 
Transaction cost regulation (TCR) consists of the study of the governance features of the 
interaction between governments and investors fundamentally,
1
Emphasizing regulation as the governance structure of these interactions, and 
understanding the organizational impact of their inherent contractual hazards, 
differentiates TCR from other approaches to regulation.  In particular, the emphasis on 
contractual hazards requires assessing real behavior, by real people in real environments 
within real institutions.
 but not exclusively, in 
utilities sectors.  As in standard transaction cost economics, the nature of contracting 
hazards is what determines the fundamental features of the governance of these 
interactions (e.g. Williamson 1979).  Regulation, and regulatory contracts, which are the 
forms that the governance of such interactions take, are then to be understood as coming 
to grips with the inherent hazards of these interactions. 
2  While understanding real behavior also implies analyzing rent 
seeking and the role of distributional concerns, these manifest themselves in the 
interaction of sector hazards with the institutional environment within which they 
operate.   In that sense, although politics is normally not necessary to understand private 
contracting, it becomes fundamental to understanding regulation as the governance of 
public / private interactions.
3
                                                 
1 Observe that I did not say “transactions” but rather interactions, as a transaction only occurs if a 
regulatory action actually takes place, which, TCE would naturally require to be an endogenous result of 
the government / investor interaction. 
  As emphasized first by Coase (1964) and subsequently by 
Williamson (1979), the analysis of regulation must be done within the proper institutional 
comparison, and with a heavy micro-analytic dose.  Thus, the supposed inefficiency of 
2 As a consequence, TCR rejects the notion of “optimal” regulation.   
3 For an institutional theory of public contracts, see Spiller (2009).   Transaction Cost Regulation 
3 
regulatory contracts, and of regulatory outcomes, must be assessed in reference to all 
relevant alternatives.
4
I. Williamson’s Incipient TCR  
  
In his path-breaking 1976 BJE,
5 Williamson sketched the fundamental tenets of a TCR 
approach.
6
“Merely to show that regulation is flawed, however, does not establish that 
regulation is an inferior mode of organizing economic activity…. 
Secondly, before regulation is supplanted, there is an obligation to assess 
the properties of the proposed alternative – not only in general, but also 
specifically with respect to the activity in question.  If the proposed mode 
is flawed in similar or different respects, the purported advantages of 
shifting out of regulation may be illusory.”
 Williamson (1976) analyzes in detail the alleged advantages of franchise 
bidding in CATV service regulation, by emphasizing the contractual details involved in 
undertaking a franchise bidding as well as a more standard regulatory process.  He starts, 
following Coase (1964), by emphasizing the need to perform real institutional 
comparisons:  
7
Using the incipient TCE approach, Williamson (1976, p. 75) then highlights seven 
features relevant to evaluating alternative modes of organizing natural monopoly supply 
 
                                                 
4 See also Williamson (1996). 
5 See, Williamson (1976). 
6 A parallel, although different, application of TCE to regulation can be found in Goldberg (1976). For an 
application to comparative regulatory governance, see Spiller (1993), later developed in Levy ad Spiller 
(1994). 
7 See, Williamson (1976, p 73).   Pablo T. Spiller 
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(with emphasis on comparing franchise bidding to other forms of regulation – including 
no regulation): 
“(1) the costs of ascertaining and aggregating consumer preferences 
through direct solicitation; (2) the efficacy of scalar bidding; (3) the 
degree to which technology is well developed; (4) demand uncertainty; (5) 
the degree to which incumbent suppliers acquire idiosyncratic skills; (6) 
the extent to which specialized, long-lived equipment is involved; and (7) 
the susceptibility of the political process to opportunistic representations 
and the differential proclivity, among modes, to make them.” 
We can reclassify these seven considerations into four that are basically transaction cost 
considerations (items 3- technology, 4- demand uncertainty, 5 & 6- specific investments 
/skills) and three that arise from political considerations (1 – preference aggregation, 2– 
efficacy of scalar bidding and 3- political opportunism).  Williamson (1976), then, set out 
the two fundamental pillars of TCR – transaction costs economics, and positive political 
theory.  TCE’s emphasis on identifying the transaction hazards as the basis for 
understanding governance, and the consequent discriminating alignment of governance 
and underlying risks; and positive political theory, which by highlighting the political 
dynamics associated to these interactions, helps to elucidate the full extent of the hazards 
associated with these interactions.   Transaction Cost Regulation 
5 
II. What Characterizes Utilities? 
Elsewhere I have defined utilities as those sectors having three fundamental features:
8
Consider, for example, a water distribution company.  Its assets have very little value in 
alternative uses (it is very expensive to dig out water mains, meters, etc); network 
externalities and economies of density imply that it may not be economical to have 
multiple water networks deployed along the same street or even neighborhoods; and 
finally, its product is consumed by a large proportion of the city's population.  Compare 
this situation to that of another industry characterized by large sunk investments: steel.  
While steel mills have very little value in alternative uses, the economies of scale and 
scope are trivial compared to the size of the market, and furthermore, while everybody 
indirectly consume steel products, very few individuals in society pay any attention to the 
price of steel.  Thus, it is not simply specific investments that characterize utilities.   
 
first, their products are consumed widely; second they exhibit important economies of 
scale and scope at the relevant levels of demand; and finally, that their investments are 
characterized by a high level of physical specificity (i.e., have a high component of sunk 
investments). 
Nor is it just economies of scale. Consider, newspapers.  It is quite clear that there are 
large economies of scale and scope in the operation of city-newspapers.  The increase in 
the speed of communications and the increased use of computer design has drastically 
increased the extent of economies of scale in the sector, while the diffusion of the internet 
has equally drastically reduced readership.  While readers may still be a relatively 
                                                 
8 See Spiller (1995).    Pablo T. Spiller 
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important portion of the population (at least of the voting population), newspapers are not 
utilities.  Although there may be substantial amount of sector specific human capital 
(reporters' contacts with local politicians may be specific to the locality), the technology 
is increasingly generic.  Printing presses may print multiple newspapers, and are 
movable, while the remaining physical assets are highly generic (computers, furniture, 
general office buildings). 
Thus, what separates utilities from the rest of the economy is the combination of three 
features: specific investments, economies of scale and scope and widespread domestic 
consumption.  These features are at the core of the contracting problems that have 
traditionally marred government / utility investors’ relations.
9 In turn, they make the 
pricing of utilities inherently political.  I posit that in the presence of highly specific 
assets, the fundamental hazards in government / utility investor interactions arise from 
two types of opportunism: governmental and third-party opportunism.
10
III. Governmental Opportunism 
   
Governmental opportunism consists of the ability of governments to change the rules of 
the game via the standard use of governmental powers to extract the quasi-rents of utility 
investors.
11
                                                 
9 See, among others, Williamson (1976); Goldberg (1976), Williamson (1988); Levy and Spiller (1994) and 
Spiller (1993). 
 Changes in the rules of the game can be done in multiple, subtle and not so 
subtle ways.  Governments may issue legislation making illegal a particular type of 
conduct, contract or pricing, even one it may have originally encouraged or even formally 
agreed to.  Consider the history of San Francisco’s hydrant rates in the late 1880s as 
10 This does not imply that utility operators/investors may not behave opportunistically (such as 
withholding information), but such opportunism is of the “standard” nature, discussed at length by the 
literature.  I will discuss the implications of private opportunism later. 
11 See Spiller (1996), Levy and Spiller (1994).     Transaction Cost Regulation 
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recently discussed in Masten (2009).
12
Governmental opportunism, however, does not have to be so drastic as a law or Decree, 
or a municipal decision, cancelling or changing the nature of contracts, pricing or 
allowable practices, but can be achieved via the subtle works of administrative process.  
The imposition of fines on a public utility for alleged quality deficiencies, or a regulatory 
decision denying a tariff increase could just do the trick.  What may seem as innocuous 
acts of regulatory supervision, may actually be nothing else but governmental 
opportunism, attempting to extract part of the utility’s quasi-rents.  The recent case of 
Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija is an interesting example. A water and sewage 
services concession granted by the Province of Tucumán, Argentina, in 1995 and 
terminated by the Province just two years later.  The process that led to the contract 
 “To overcome the water company resistance to 
new investment …, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors agreed to payments of $2.50 
per hydrant per month in 1882, increased to $5.00 in 1895, “in return for the company 
making investments in system extension and pipe enlargement for fire protection”…. 
Beginning in 1898, however, following investments by the company that achieved an 
increase in per-capita consumption of more than a third between 1880 and 1890 despite 
population growth of almost 30%, the city undertook a series of rate reductions - 
characterized as a “breach of trust” by the company- cut[ting] hydrant payments...from 
the previous level of $5.00 per hydrant per month to a rate amounting [to] $1.75 per 
hydrant per month..., despite previous implicit agreements with Spring Valley to maintain 
existing charges in return for water company investments in system improvements….” 
                                                 
12 Masten (2009).   Pablo T. Spiller 
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termination, and described in unusual detail by the Arbitration Panel in its Award,
13 is a 
textbook, and probably an extreme, example of what I call governmental opportunism, 
whereby a government uses its regulatory and executive powers to achieve a tariff 
reduction not allowed by the regulatory framework.  In fact, the Aguas del Aconquija 
Award shows the multiplicity of instruments governments have at their disposal to 
attempt to extract a utility’s quasi-rents.  In this case, the Provincial Government seems to 
have used all its formal powers - regulatory decisions, legislative acts, executive decrees, 
attorney general recommendations, even judicial decisions– and informal powers – press 
releases, Ombudsman’s letters, public announcements, and the like-, to force the 
company’s hand.
14
Investors facing the risk of governmental opportunism will either not invest, or demand 
up-front compensation for that risk.  Either strategy, however, as the case of Aguas del 
Aconquija shows, may not alleviate the risk, but rather may, at the end, exacerbate it.  
  
Government opportunism affects not only private investors but public operators as well.  
Since the government has direct control over publicly owned companies, Savedoff and 
Spiller
15 explain how the threat of governmental opportunism against publicly owned 
companies may lead those companies to protect their cash flows against such hazards by 
undertaking actions,
16
                                                 
13 See, Award – “In the Arbitration between Compañia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal 
S.A. Claimants v. Argentine Republic, Respondent, Case No. ARB/97/3” issued on 20 August 2007.  
 such as hiring too many permanent or transitory employees, 
granting excessive benefits, and the like, which translate into low efficiency and quality 
levels. 
14 At the end, the company attempted to rescind the contract due to Governmental breach, at which point 
the Province terminated the concession. The service remained in the company’s hand for another year, at 
which point it was taken over by ENHOSA, a federal water service entity.  See, Award, at page 112. 
15 Savedoff and Spiller (1999). 
16 Savedoff and Spiller (1999, p. 17) generically describe this practice as “cash hiding.”   Transaction Cost Regulation 
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It is the existence of sunk investments that makes governmental opportunism a 
fundamental hazard in government/utility investor interactions.  First, the fact that a large 
component of a utility’s investments is sunk implies that once the investment is 
undertaken the operator will be willing to continue operating as long as operating 
revenues exceed operating costs. Since operating costs do not include a return on 
investments (but only on the alternative value of these assets), the operating company 
will be willing to operate even if prices are below total average costs.  Second, the 
existence of strong economies of scale and scope implies that there will be few suppliers 
in each locality.  Thus, the whiff of monopoly will always surround utility operations.  
And finally, because utility services tend to be massively consumed, politicians and 
interest groups will care about the level of utility pricing.   
Sunk investments, then, provide politicians with the opportunity to behave 
opportunistically vis-à-vis the investing company.  In other words, sunk investments 
expose the utility to the risk of potential expropriation, which may be indirect and 
undertaken by subtle means.    
As in private contracting, if specific assets are at stake, safeguards are needed for 
investments to be forthcoming in an efficient manner or at reasonable prices.  In the 
absence of safeguards investment inefficiencies may arise in several fronts.  First, 
underinvestment will be the norm.  Second, investments may take place exclusively in 
segments whose market return is very high and where the payback period is relatively 
short.
17
                                                 
17 An alternative way of reducing the specificity of the investment is by customers undertaking the 
financing of the sunk assets.  For example, SAGUAPAC, the water public service cooperative of Santa 
Cruz, Bolivia, required commitment of customer financing prior to undertaking an expansion plan. For a 
  Third, maintenance expenditures may be kept to the minimum, thus degrading   Pablo T. Spiller 
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quality.  Fourth, investment may be undertaken with technologies that have a lower 
degree of specificity, even at the cost of, again, degrading quality.
18  Fifth, up-front rents 
may be achieved by very high prices which although may provide incentives for some 
investment, may be politically unsustainable.
19
Governance schemes that do not limit the potential for governmental opportunism, then, 
create strong inefficiencies and poor sector performance.
 
20  Poor quality, lack of 
investments and high prices lead, eventually, to more conflicts between the operator and 
the government.  Unless those are resolved, popular support for efficient pricing will 
fade, as higher prices will not translate into improved service.  In those environments, 
government ownership may be the only feasible mode.
21
                                                                                                                                            
discussion of Saguapac’s strategy, see Walton (2003).  Similarly, Chile’s Electricity Services General Law 
of 1982 allows the utilities to require that customers requesting service finance, via a reimbursable charge, 
any required expansion cost, or that they undertake the investment directly.  See Arts. 75 and 76. 
(http://www.sec.cl/OpenDocs/data/13/DFL%201%20Electricidad.doc) 
 
18 In this sense it is not surprising that private telecommunications operators that rushed to develop the 
telecommunications sector in Easter European and African countries, moved first and foremost into cellular 
rather than fixed link networks.  While cellular has a higher long run cost than fixed link, and on some 
quality dimensions is also an inferior product, the magnitude of investment in specific assets is much 
smaller than in fixed link networks.  Furthermore, a large portion of the specific investments in cellular 
telephony are undertaken by the customers themselves (who purchase the handsets).  See also, Waverman 
et al (nd). 
19 The privatization of Argentina’s telecommunications companies is particularly illuminating.  Prior to the 
privatization, telephone prices were raised well beyond international levels.  It is not surprising, that 
following the privatization the government reneged on aspects of the license, like its price indexation as 
ways to limit the quasi-rents of the investors.  The initial high prices, though, allowed the companies to 
remain profitable, even following government’s deviation from the license provisions.  See Levy and 
Spiller (1996). 
20 While the link between aggregate institutional features of a country and general economic growth is by 
now a growth industry, few have taken the step of linking actual country’s general and regulatory 
institutions and explored the impact on sector performance.  For such examples, see Henisz and Zelner 
(2001) for an application to investment in telecommunications, and Henisz (2002) for an application to 
railways, telecommunications and electricity generation across 129 countries over the period 1815-1998. 
21 For an analysis to the water sector, see Savedoff and Spiller (1999).  For an alternative view, see Masten 
(2009).   Transaction Cost Regulation 
11 
III.1 Regulation as a Response to Governmental Opportunism 
Facing the threat of governmental opportunism, utility investors would require particular 
safeguards to invest.  That is, the development of institutional arrangements that will 
limit the government’s ability to behave opportunistically once the utility undertook its 
investment program.  Such institutional arrangements are nothing but the design of a 
regulatory framework.  They will have to stipulate price setting and conflict resolution 
procedures (arbitration or judicial), investment policies, quality controls and so on and so 
forth, that are both credible, in the sense that the Government will not be able to by-pass 
them easily, and at the same time substantially limit the government discretionary 
interpretation of the same.  In other words, regulatory procedures, if credible, must 
restrain the government from opportunistically expropriating the utilities' sunk 
investments.  This, however, does not mean that the utility has to receive assurances of a 
rate of return nature, or that it has to receive exclusive licenses.  In some countries, 
however, such assurances may be the only way to limit the government's discretionary 
powers. 
III.2 Sources of Regulatory Commitment – Positive Political Theory 
The limits to governmental opportunism are, however, institutional.
22
                                                 
22 Spiller (1996a) and Spiller (1996b).   
 The potential for 
the opportunistic use of legislative powers depends, to a large extent, on the control the 
executive may exercise over the legislature.  Thus, a fragmented polity may provide more 
assurances to investors than a highly centralized government.  Similarly, a judiciary with 
a tradition of independence may put some limits on opportunistic governmental behavior. 
Concession contracts, as long as they are upheld by local courts, may also provide a level   Pablo T. Spiller 
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of commitment against opportunistic behavior.  It is, thus, not surprising that the UK, a 
country characterized by a centralized government but with a long tradition of judicial 
independence, would have adopted a regulatory system based on concession contracts, 
while the regulatory structure in the US, a country characterized by fragmented 
government, is based on judicial review of administrative procedures (Spiller 1996a). 
Political and social institutions not only affect the ability to restrain administrative action, 
but also have an independent impact on the type of regulation that can be implemented, 
and hence on the appropriate balance between commitment and flexibility. For example, 
regulatory rules involving relatively high power incentive rules (e.g., price caps, 
incentive schemes, use of competition) usually require granting substantial discretion to 
the regulators.  Thus, unless the country's institutions allow for the separation of 
arbitrariness from useful regulatory discretion, systems that grant too much 
administrative discretion may not generate the high levels of investment and welfare 
expected from private utility investment.
23  Conversely, some countries might have 
regulatory regimes that drastically limit the scope of regulatory flexibility.
24  Although 
such regulatory governance schemes may look inefficient, they may in fact fit the 
institutional endowments of the countries in question, and may provide substantial 
incentives for investment.
25
                                                 
23 See Levy and Spiller (1996) for an overall discussion of how various countries adjusted their regulatory 
structure to their institutional environments so as to cope with potential exercise of governmental 
opportunism.  
 
24 Spiller and Sampson (1996) make the case that monopoly and rate of return regulation in Jamaica 
telecommunications in the 1990s provided such incentives, at the cost of regulatory and technological 
flexibility.  
25 The impact of institutional arrangements on utility investment has received some attention during the last 
10 years.  See footnote 20 supra.  Cross country analyses, however, have substantial difficulties in 
overcoming fundamental endogeneity concerns of the type discussed in Hamilton and Nickerson (2003).   Transaction Cost Regulation 
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III.3 Contrasting Firm with Governmental Opportunism 
At the core of most theories of regulation is a normative or passive view of the regulatory 
process.  For some, regulation is perceived as an arena where conflicting private interests 
are accommodated, while in others regulatory rules are optimally designed to placate the 
firm’s profit motive subject to informational constraints.  The former approaches political 
actors as essentially passive, while the latter represents political actors as benevolent, or 
at best as functionally utilitarian, in having objective functions reflecting the welfare of 
multiple constituencies. TCR sees political actors differently.  They are not different from 
any other economic agents, they are neither passive nor benevolent.  As Williamson 
(1975, p.26) say, they are opportunistic – willing to lie and deceive and to pursue “self-
interest with guile.”   
There is, though, a fundamental difference between governmental opportunism and the 
opportunism or exercise of market power that is perceived, by most neoclassical 
economists, to be at the root of the regulatory problem.  If what drives regulatory policy-
making is market power, then that could be managed by the application of general 
antitrust (and common law) provisions.
26  There would be no need for industry specific 
regulation.  In the US regulatory agencies were created more than 100 years ago, at times 
when the pressing regulatory issues were investment incentives in the presence of strong 
pressure to limit prices.
27
                                                 
26 This light-handed regulation approach was implemented in New Zealand following the reforms of the 
mid 1980s.  See Evans et al (1996).   
  Thus, although on a day-to-day regulators’ main concerns are 
indeed firm opportunism and the restrain of market power, rather than thinking how to 
27 Troesken (1996) and (1997) has argued that the early 1900 movement away from municipal regulation 
towards state regulation was a way to reduce the incentives to behave opportunistically by the municipal 
regulators. See also Troesken and Geddes (2003) analysis of the municipalization of water works in the late 
1800s early 1900s in the US.  See Masten (2009) for a differing view.   Pablo T. Spiller 
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restrain themselves from expropriating the firms’ quasi-rents, the origins of regulatory 
governance is rooted in providing investment incentives by restraining governmental 
opportunism.   
Although in some environments regulatory governance may have also been designed to 
facilitate private capture, such design exposes the regulatory process to political capture 
following a turn of the political wheel.
28
IV. Third Party Opportunism
  Private investors fearing such events will be 
cautious on long-term investments, and more interested in short term gains.  Thus, 
institutional and regulatory designs that limit the potential for governmental opportunism 
may not only facilitate investment, but may also serve to credibly enhance the political 
restrain over operators’ opportunism. 
29
The essence of public policy, of which utility regulation is one, is that it relies on the 
state’s monopoly to use peoples’ monies without their expressed consent.  Public utility 
regulation is not an exception, as it involves, directly or indirectly, the use of the state’s 
monopoly over public funds.
 
30  Reasonably working societies, then, will naturally 
develop ways for public policy to be subject to public scrutiny so as to avoid corruption 
and graft.
31
                                                 
28 See, Esfahani (1996), pp: 145-201 for a fascinating description of the regulatory process in the 
Philippines, where political alignment between the utilities’ shareholders and the government seems to 
have been determinative of the shareholders’ incentives to invest. 
  Public contract scrutiny, for example, is normally undertaken by designated 
agencies in charge of contract supervision.  In the United States, while individual 
29 This discussion follows Spiller (2009). 
30 Utility regulation can be construed as an implicit system of taxes and subsidies, and hence, can be 
thought as using public funds, even if 100% of the utility revenues come from customers.  
31 Purely private contracts, on the other hand, are normally protected against public scrutiny, often requiring 
a judicial act to make a private contract subject to public scrutiny.  Some private contracts, however, are 
public for obvious reasons.  The registration of land ownership requires the registration of real estate 
transactions, making some aspects of real estate transactions then potentially open to public scrutiny.   Transaction Cost Regulation 
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departments have agencies in charge of auditing their procurement, the Office of 
Management and Budget, the Government Accountability Office, and the Congressional 
Budget Office routinely examine the procurement performance of government agencies 
and of the auditing agencies themselves.
32
Regulatory agencies in the United States, however, are seldom supervised by another 
agency.
   
33  Instead, they tend to be supervised directly by congressional committees 
whose work is influenced by interested third parties.
34  In fact, in their seminal article 
McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) argue that politicians can manage the bureaucracy via 
“fire alarms,” whereby interest groups (interested third parties) will “pull the alarm” 
when agencies stray from the politician’s preferred policy path.  They further make the 
point that “a predominantly fire-alarm oversight policy is likely to be more effective … 
than a predominantly police-patrol policy.”
35
A fundamental feature of interest groups as monitors, though, is that they are interested. 
In other words, they are biased.  They provide information only when it is to their 
advantage.  That is, the third party (or parties) may behave opportunistically. As it relates 
to government / utility interactions, interested third parties may have incentives to 
  Thus, third party supervision is 
fundamental in a democratic society. 
                                                 
32 For example, the Defense Contract Audit Agency, formed in 1965, is in charge of performing audits to 
all the US Defense Department contracts.  The performance of the DCAA, in turn, is supervised by the 
OMB, while the GOA and the CBO routinely review specific programs of the Department of Defense.  See, 
for example, CBO, “Replacing and Repairing Equipment Used in Iraq and Afghanistan: The Army’s Reset 
Program,” Pub. No. 2809, September 2007; see also, GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Department of 
Defense Actions on Program Manager Empowerment and Accountability, November 9, 2007.  
33 In the UK, however, the regulatory process involves the use of the competition commission.  See Spiller 
and Vogelsang (1997) 
34 See, McCubbins and Schwartz (1984); McCubbins, Noll and Weingast (1987); McCubbins, Noll and 
Weingast (1989). deFigueiredo, Spiller and Urbiztondo (1999) also show that politicians prefer not only a 
proliferation of interested interest groups monitoring agencies, but also prefer them to come from divergent 
perspectives. 
35 McCubbins and Schwartz (1984: 171).   Pablo T. Spiller 
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challenge, when by such action they benefit, the “probity” of the interaction, thereby 
affecting directly the perceived probity of the public agent in charge.  Such incentives 
may exist when third parties compete with the public agent in the political market.  
Benefits, however, may arise also in the economic sphere.  In both it may involve the 
displacement of the incumbent (and competing) public agent.  In the political sphere, the 
challenge may be deemed successful if because of the challenge the public agent is 
replaced by an agent related, or more to the liking, of the interested third party.  As it 
relates to the economic sphere, the challenge may be deemed successful if the private 
party is replaced or the terms of the contract or dimensions of the utility’s conduct are 
changed in ways that benefit the third party.  But it is precisely because of competition in 
the political market that such challenges are particularly dangerous to the private and 
public agent alike.
36
In a competitive political market environment third party opportunism, depending on the 
challenger’s credibility, may entail significant costs to the public agent. The public agent 
may have to incur significant time and expense to defend its actions,
 
37 may have to leave 
its public position, or in the extreme, if the challenge is fully successful, may be demoted 
or prosecuted.
38
                                                 
36 For example, the replacement of the private party may damage the political credibility of the incumbent 
public agent, weakening its position vis-à-vis a third party interested in its replacement. 
   
37 Public agents would not be expected to leave their positions without a (political) fight.  Multiple interest 
groups may be expected to contribute to the public discussion following a challenge.  Some groups, aligned 
with the beneficiaries of the particular contract or policy, may come to the public agent defense, and help to 
limit the effectiveness, or credibility, of the challenge (de Figueiredo et al 1999). 
38 This effect works, although dampened, also in non-democratic environments, as long as there is 
competition for political power.  In such environments, though, allegations of corruption and graft may be 
rationally seen as politically motivated equilibrium outcomes, and hence not have a high degree of 
credibility.  For an excellent application of this idea, and its implication for the organization of society, see 
Di Tella and Dal Bó (2003).   Transaction Cost Regulation 
17 
Given the inherent informational asymmetries between the interested third party, the 
courts, and the public in general, the challenge may be exercised even if the action is 
ethical and/or legal.  In fact, the more complex the government/utility interaction is, the 
higher the inherent informational asymmetries, and thus, the higher the probability of 
third party opportunism.   
The recent example of Aguas del Tunari (AdT), another failed water concession contract, 
provides a potential illustration of third party opportunism.  Aguas del Tunari was a 40 
year water and sewage services management contract in the City of Cochabamba, granted 
by Government of Bolivia, in September 1999, to the AdT consortium led by 
International Water (Tunary) Ldt, a Cayman company fully owned by Bechtel Enterprise 
Holdings Inc, a US corporation.
39 Operations started in November 1999.  In January 2000 
a tariff increase was instituted, raising average revenue between 35% and 51%,
40 with 
tariff increases ranging, according to Bechtel, from 10% for the poorest segments to more 
than 100% for the richest segments of Cochabamba.
41
                                                 
39 Aguas del Tunari S.A. v República de Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Respondent’s 
Ojections to Jurisdiction, October 21, 2005, Washington DC, at p.13. 
  Although there were Right away, 
civil protests started.  Initially led by a “Civic Committee,” demanding the renegotiation 
of the contract, the “Coalition in Defense of Water and Life,” representing Cochabamba 
40 Bechtel claims the average increase was 35% while the Democracy Center reports a study run by 
SEMAPA, the public utility that operated the water services prior to AdT, claiming that prices increase by 
51% on average. See Bechtel Bechtel Corporation, “Bechtel Perspective on the Aguas del Tunari Water 
Concession in Cochabamba, Bolivia,” March 16, 2005, available at http://www.bechtel.com/2005-03-
16_38.html, and Bechtel, “Cochabamba and the Aguas del Tunari Consortium,” March 2005, available at 
http://www.bechtel.com/assets/files/PDF/Cochabambafacts0305.pdf .  Democracy Center, “Bechtel vs. 
Bolivia, the Water Rate Hikes by Bechtel’s Bolivian Company (Aguas del Tunari) The Real Numbers,” 
n.d., available at http://democracyctr.org/bolivia/investigations/water/waterbills-global.htm. 
41 See Bechtel (2005).  The Democracy Center’s computation of rate increases, however, shows a relatively 
homogen   Pablo T. Spiller 
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citizens, but also tanqueros,
42
The issues surrounding the granting and termination of AdT are highly complex.  A prior 
privatization attempt in 1998 failed to attract any bidders.  A subsequent bid attracted 
only a single bidder, the AdT consortium.  Under the new contract, the consortium was 
not required to own facilities nor resources.  It was, however, required to invest in what 
seemed to be an unprofitable dam and aqueduct (Misicuni) project,
coca growers, and industry, started to demand the 
termination of the contract.  Violent protests started in February, which led to the roll 
back of the tariff increase.  Violence pursued and intensified in April 2000, leading to 
several deaths.  After the violence erupted, the Government terminated the contract, and 
reversed the water privatization efforts. 
43 and was required to 
pay down the public utility’s debt.  The contract involved only potable water, not 
agricultural water, and affected only connected, not private or community wells.  
Nevertheless, the emphasis of the interest groups was on agricultural and local water 
rights, fear of appropriation by AdT of privately developed wells, and potentially very 
high rate hikes for the poor; issues that, in principle, were not to take place.  The 
complexity of the concession contract, the negotiated arrangement – with a claim of lack 
of transparency-
44
                                                 
42 Tanqueros are water truck operators who distribute water in unserved areas.  According to 
commentators, tanqueros in Bolivia charge those without access 10 times what water distribution 
companies do.  See Finnegan (2002).  Walker et.al. (1999, see box 2.4) reports similar results for 
Tegucigalpa, where homes without connection to the water system paid in 1994 L27 per m3, while they 
would have paid L2 per m3 if they were connected. 
 rather than a transparent bid, its monopoly nature, as well as the 
multiplicity of those affected by the granting of the concession (including the tanqueros, 
urban dwellers, industry, among others) and those who may benefit from the political 
43 See Bechtel (2005). 
44 According to the Decision on Jurisdiction (at p.13/14), “…on September 3, 1999 … was a newspaper 
article reported that the Defense of Water Committee criticized the negotiations as lacking of transparency 
and requested that the Bolivian government publicize the true rates that would govern before it concluded 




46 union leaders, among others) created a 
highly fertile environment in which claims about corruption, potential appropriation of 
water pipes and agricultural water rights, exacerbated by the tariff increases, could not be 
easily countered by neither the state nor the company.
47  The result was widespread 
protests –in multiple other cities, and many on topics wholly unrelated to the water 
concession,
48 leading to a military curfew, six deaths, the subsequent termination of the 




The exposure to third-party opportunism creates risks to both the public agent and the 
utility investor. In response, both will have incentives to formalize their relation (i.e., to 
move away from implicit agreements), and to make it highly specific. Furthermore, to 
mitigate the risk of third-party opportunism, these regulatory contracts will be designed 
so as to limit potential challenges, both at the signing and implementation stages.  As a 
consequence, regulatory contracts will tend to demand relatively simple compensation 
schemes, limit high volatility in cash flows to the investor, and rigid procedural 
                                                 
45 For an interesting interview with President Evo Morales, who at the time was a national legislator and 
leader of the coca growers, about the role of the political opposition in the AdT case, see Democracy Now!, 
“Bolivian President Evo Morales on President Obama: "I Can’t Believe a Black President Can Hold So 
Much Vengeance Against an Indian President,” April 23, 2010, available at 
http://www.democracynow.org/2010/4/23/bolivian_president_evo_morales_to_president. 
46 Coca growers were at the time on a conflict with the Government because of the Bolivian coca 
eradication program (Finnegan 2002). 
47 According to the Decision on Jurisdiction (at p.14) Bolivia, in its Memorial objecting to ICSID 
jurisdiction, stated “In fairness, no one negotiating the concession agreement could have anticipated the 
intensely hostile reaction that greeted AdT immediately upon the Agreement’s signing.”  See also Bechtel 
(2005). 
48 Finnegan (2002). 
49 Finnegan (2002).  A similar group then fought the “gas wars” in 2003 during the presidency of Sanchez 
de Lozada, this time under the leadership of future president Evo Morales.   Pablo T. Spiller 
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processes, including formal procedures for renegotiation.
50
In other words, the risk of third-party opportunism means that “relational” contracting is 
less likely to evolve in utility regulation.  Governments, then, will have difficulty entering 
into close relations with utilities, in which contract adaptation takes place without formal 
renegotiations, specific administrative processes and/or litigation.  Furthermore, 
regulation will tend to be complex, involving multiple rules and procedures, and will be 
subject to substantial litigation.  The added complexity required to limit the potential for 
third party opportunism will make regulation look as if marred by “red-tape,” “conflict 
driven” and “inefficient” overall.  This inefficiency, however, may fail Williamson’s 
remediableness test.
  As in private contracting, 
though, these adjustments may not fully mitigate third-party opportunism, and 
government/utility investors’ interactions are likely to experience a higher degree of 
conflict than contracts among private parties.   
51
IV.2 Institutional Environments 
  In other words, the perceived inefficiency of regulation is an 
equilibrium response to its hazards, and in particular, to the hazards of third party 
opportunism, a defining feature of public contracting in general, and of regulation in 
particular.   
The potential for third party opportunism will depend, to a large extent, on the nature of 
the institutional environment in which the investment will take place.  To thrive, third 
party opportunism requires some extent of political contestability and fragmentation.  
                                                 
50 Complex compensation schemes may not pass public scrutiny and be perceived as consenting to 
investors’ demands. Similarly, high payoff volatility must imply instances where investors may receive 
very high transfers, which may not be easy to explain to the public, and perceived as corrupt. In the same 
way, flexible procedures may be perceived as granting favors to the investor, and thus increase the public 
agent exposure to third party opportunism. 
51 See, Williamson (1999).   Transaction Cost Regulation 
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Although internal party politics could provide the environment for fragmentation, and for 
the type of political displacement required for third party opportunists to prosper, 
centralized party power limits the upward mobility of political mavericks, and thus the 
potential for internal third party opportunists.
52  On the other hand, political instability, 
the caldron where governmental opportunism thrives, is also conducive for third party 
opportunism as the cost of removing incumbent politicians falls.  In the middle, between 
stable centralized party control and rampant political instability, is where most of the 
world democracies fall.  “Open access” states naturally facilitate the development and 
organization of third party interest groups.
53  In these societies, public policies become 
de-personalized, and governments are constrained in their ability to limit – whether by 
withdrawing funding, political harassment or direct violence – the development and 
organization of such groups.  It is in these societies where the threat of third party 
opportunism becomes more credible, as such challenges may not be easily covered up by 
side payments or the direct threat of the recourse to violence.  In “natural” states, 
following again North, Wallis and Weingast (2006) nomenclature, the public agent may 
have more instruments at her disposal to quash such challenges, and thus, it could be 
argued that her ability to overcome a third party challenge is increased.
54
This discussion, then, suggests that third party opportunism and governmental 
opportunism may not appear in similar circumstances.  While the potential for 
 
                                                 
52 Two interesting parallel examples are the demise of the PRI and the LDP in Mexico and Japan 
respectively.  Both parties controlled their respective polities for more than half a century, providing 
internal party mechanisms for resolution of public conflicts, as well as for the rotation, displacement and 
succession of public agents.  The framework provided in this paper predicts that public contracting in 
general, and regulation in particular, became much more cumbersome and rigid in Mexico and Japan since 
these parties lost power. This is a topic for future research. 
53 Following the nomenclature introduced by North, Wallis and Weingast (2006). 
54 Di Tella and Dal Bó (2003) consider a model where, in equilibrium, the party in power spends resources 
to counter smear campaigns, judicial harassment or assassination attempts by interest groups who, in 
equilibrium, are intended to remove the president from office.     Pablo T. Spiller 
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governmental opportunism requires an institutional environment with few institutional 
limitations to governmental discretion, the essence of “natural” states, the potential for 
third party opportunism is limited in such environments by the same discretionary ability 
of governments.  Third party opportunism, then, would be more effective in open access 
than in “natural” states, while the risk of governmental opportunism may be acute in the 
latter. 
IV.3 Interactions 
Thus, the adaptation of regulatory responses to hazards would require paying more 
attention to procedures in environments more prone to third party opportunism, while 
environments characterized by the threat of governmental opportunism would require 
more attention to limiting regulatory discretion.  When these adaptations cannot be easily 
implemented, then, vertical integration, i.e., public ownership, would be the norm. 
Vertical integration, however, may not alleviate the problems associated with third party 
and governmental opportunism.  Public vertical integration may not solve the “within the 
bureaucracy” contracting problems.  Not only, as discussed, governmental opportunism 
affects public and private entities alike, but third party opportunism concerns arise also 
with the implementation of high power incentives within the bureaucracy itself.  For the 
same reason that high power incentives may not be appropriate for regulatory schemes, 
high power incentives are not often appropriate for within the bureaucracy relations as 
high transfers to public employees will naturally raise probity questions, and will thus 
increase the risk of third party opportunism.
55
                                                 
55 There are many instances, though, of the introduction of some type of high power incentives in 
bureaucracies.  For example, Mexico’s higher bureaucratic echelon under the PRI has traditionally been 
composed of a high paid technocracy, linked by a network of personal and political relations to the 
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Complete absence of government intervention in the utility sector, however, may not be 
feasible either.  The same forces that drive governmental opportunism imply that 
governmental absence from intervention in utility sectors may simply not be credible.
56
There are, then, three basic types of equilibrium organizations for utilities: public 
ownership, flexible regulation and rigid regulation.
  
Thus, regulatory governance is unavoidable in the utility sector, even without having to 
consider monopoly power. 
57
In sum, government/utility investor’s interactions are plagued by third party and 
governmental opportunism. While the institutional environment most propitious for the 
development of both types of opportunism differ and so differ the nature of governance 
structures that may each generate, the framework provided here suggests that both types 
of hazards interact in increasing the specificity and rigidity of regulation and of 
regulatory contracts causing difficulties in adapting to shocks and leading to low-
powered incentives. Similarly, both types of hazards, and their combination, lead to more 
litigation and conflict, including the potential “inefficient” termination of utility 
providers, than would normally be observed in private contracts. These “inefficiencies” 
  The type of organizational outcome 
observed in a jurisdiction, then, is the combined result of the polity’s ability to provide 
commitment against governmental opportunism, and the potential threats from third party 
opportunism. 
                                                                                                                                            
members of cabinet. As a consequence, career advancement has been based on informal norms of 
reciprocity and loyalty, where bad performance implies disloyal behavior, leading to discontinuation either 
right away or when the bureau chief moves to another position.  See, Grindle (1977). 
56 This does not mean, however, that if technology changes, and economies of scale drastically fall, or 
investments become less sunk, that lack of intervention by governments is not feasible.  In fact, the 
development of electricity transmission over long ranges imply that electricity generation lost its “utility” 
characteristic, leading to major deregulation attempts throughout the world.  For an early description of 
New Zealand’s light handed regulation experiment, see Evans et al (1996). 
57 I will place the light handed regulation approaches within the “flexible regulation” framework.   Pablo T. Spiller 
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persist in equilibrium, and thus utility regulation cannot be simply compared to 
competitive environments where the hazards characterizing utility investment are not 
present. 
V. TCR and Alternative Theories of Regulation 
I’ll discuss here briefly the relation of TCR to two alternative theories of regulation: The 
Chicago School and Incentive Theory.  TCR differs from the Chicago School, as 
exemplified in the path breaking work by Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976) and Posner 
(1971), in that, although rent seeking and distributional effects are important to 
understand regulatory outcomes, TCR emphasizes the interaction between the particular 
hazards associated with the sector and the institutional environment in which the sector 
operates.  The solution to the associated hazards, then, will impact on the nature of 
regulatory institutions, how regulation operates, and on sector performance.  In other 
words, TCR calls for the opening of the black box of regulation.  TCR also differs from 
the incentives theory of regulation, as developed following the path breaking work of, 
among others, Loeb and Magat  (1979), Baron and Myerson  (1982),
  and Laffont and 
Tirole,
58
                                                 
58 See the summary of their work in Laffont and Tirole (1993). 
 in two main respects.  First, TCR emphasizes that the contracting schemes that 
are required to provide second best incentives are dependent on the institutional 
environment in which the firms operate.  By developing the link between the institutional 
environment and the type of regulatory institutions that are feasible, we can, implicitly, 
develop the institutional conditions under which incentive regulation becomes feasible.  
Second, since the incentive theory of regulation shares the “black box” approach to   Transaction Cost Regulation 
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politics of the Chicago School,
59
VI. Conclusion 
 the emphasis on institutional determinants rather than 
pure efficiency incentives separates TCR also from the incentive theory of regulation.   
The brief introduction to TCR presented here provides a comparative framework to 
understand both the rise and evolution of regulatory institutions over time and across 
jurisdictions.  It emphasizes that regulatory governances cannot be mimicked, nor can 
easily be compared across jurisdictions, as regulatory performance also responds to the 
hazards inherent to the institutional environment in which it operates.  In sum, TCR calls 
for a detailed analysis of hazards inherent to utilities given the institutional environment 
in which they operate. 
                                                 
59 Observe that in most of the incentive theory of regulation literature, the regulatory process is described 
by a regulator’s utility function.  Interesting extensions into hierarchical or more dynamic models of 
regulation have brought some institutional flavors to this literature.  See, for example, Demski and 
Sappington (1987); Baron and Besanko (1987); and Laffont and Tirole (1993).   Pablo T. Spiller 
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